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Abstract
The growing awareness of the problem of false confessions has lead social science
researchers to investigate the factors that influence true vs. false confessions. Previous
research suggested that minimization and maximization techniques may be interpreted
by a suspect as the equivalent of an offer of leniency and a threat of harsher
punishment, respectively. The current studies seek to further this literature by
distinguishing between minimization and maximization techniques that may or may not
influence a suspect’s perceptions of the consequences associated with confessing.
Results indicate that techniques that manipulate the perceived consequences of
confessing increase false confession rates while those techniques that do not
manipulate the perceived consequences of confessing increase true confession rates.
The practical and theoretical implications of these findings are discussed.
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“Should I Just Confess?”: The Influence of Perceived Consequences Associated with
Confessing on the Likelihood of True vs. False Confessions
The Deskovic Case
Jeff Deskovic was 16 years old when he falsely confessed to the rape and
murder of his 15 year old classmate. He falsely confessed to this crime after an intense
interrogation conducted by multiple police investigators lasting six hours. During this
time, Jeff was also administered three polygraph examinations. Police first suspected
Jeff because he was late to school the day after the girl had disappeared and then
appeared overly emotional and distraught due to her death. During his interrogation, in
which Jeff was isolated from the support of his parents or legal advice, investigators told
him they were convinced of his guilt and misleadingly informed him that he had failed
the polygraph test. By the end of the interrogation, Jeff was curled up in the fetal
position underneath a table. He was brought to trial based solely on the confession
evidence even though testing on the DNA evidence found on the victim excluded Jeff as
a match. A jury convicted Jeff of rape and murder based solely on his false confession
and he spent over 15 years in prison until he was exonerated in 2006 through the use of
more sophisticated DNA testing technology. The DNA from the victim was later found to
match Steven Cunningham, who was in prison for another murder, and he later
confessed to the crime for which Jeff Deskovic had been wrongfully convicted. Similar
examples of false confessions leading to wrongful conviction can be found on the
Innocence Project website (www.innocenceproject.org). According to the data on this
website, between 20% and 25% of the over 200 wrongful conviction cases were
influenced, in part, by a false confession from the defendant (Drizin & Leo, 2004).
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The Problem of False Confessions
Due to the growing awareness of the false confession phenomenon, social
scientists have begun to examine the costs of false confession and wrongful conviction
to the innocent. Drizin and Leo (2004) have analyzed 125 cases of “proven” false
confessions in the United States and the resulting data provide significant insight into
the repercussions of a false confession for the innocent person. In order to be classified
as a “proven” false confession and be included in the Drizin and Leo (2004) analysis,
one of four criteria had to be met: (a) the confession was for a crime that did not actually
happen (b) it can be established that the suspect did not commit the crime because it
would be physically impossible for him/her to do so (c) the actual guilty party is
discovered and corroborating evidence is obtained to determine that person’s guilt (d)
DNA or other types of scientific evidence can confirm the suspect’s innocence. In Drizin
and Leo’s (2004) analysis, 81% of defendants that had falsely confessed and
consequently went to trial were convicted of the crime. Additionally, 11% chose to plea
bargain their cases to avoid the possibility of receiving the death penalty. After
conviction, 80% of these innocent defendants were sentenced to more than 10 years in
prison and 61% of those actually spent more than five years incarcerated before they
were exonerated.
Given the role of confession evidence in many of the wrongful conviction cases
and the cost of conviction for the innocent, research has also examined how mock
jurors perceive confession evidence. Kassin and Neumann (1997) presented
participants with trial summaries containing confession evidence, eyewitness testimony
and character testimony. Their results indicated that the confession evidence was
2

significantly more damaging to the defendant’s case than the eyewitness or character
testimony. In a similar study, Kassin and Sukel (1997) asked participants to read a
transcript of a murder trial that contained a confession obtained either during a high
pressure interrogation or a low pressure interrogation. Participants reported that they
placed less weight on the confession if it was elicited during a high pressure
interrogation. Despite this, participants continued to convict the defendant based upon
the confession even in the high pressure interrogation condition. The results of these
two studies suggest that a confession may have an overwhelming impact on a jury’s
decision to convict. Unfortunately, recent research by Kassin, Meissner and Norwick
(2005) suggests that both students and police perform at chance levels in distinguishing
between true and false confessions. Given that jurors are unable to recognize and
appropriately discount false confession evidence, researchers have begun to examine
specific interrogation techniques, with the goal of identifying those that might lead to
coerced, and possibly false, confessions.
Interrogation Techniques
The Reid Technique of investigative interviewing is the most widely used
interrogative approach in the United States (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). The first step
of this technique is a pre-interrogation interview, the Behavior Analysis Interview (BAI).
This interview is conducted to identify any deception on the part of the suspect through
his or her verbal and non-verbal behavior. However, research suggests that law
enforcement officers, as well as the average person, perform only slightly better than
chance when attempting to detect truth vs. deception (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Vrij,
2000). Research also suggests that police investigators often demonstrate a guilt bias
3

when evaluating suspects (Meissner & Kassin, 2002; 2004). Results from one study
indicate that the BAI actually produced a pattern in which false presumptions of guilt
could be placed on innocent suspects, opposite of the intended purpose of the BAI (Vrij,
Mann, & Fisher, 2006a). Despite this research indicating people are poor lie detectors,
the Reid Technique encourages investigators to interrogate suspects only after they
have been found to be deceptive during the BAI.
Once a suspect has been deemed deceptive, an accusatorial interrogation
begins on the assumption that the suspect is guilty. Kassin and Gudjonsson (2004)
have divided the Reid Interrogation Technique into three processes: isolation,
confrontation, and minimization. While in isolation, the police separate the suspect from
family and other forms of support in order to intensify feelings of stress and anxiety
while alone in the interrogation room. During the confrontation phase, the interrogator
accuses the suspect of the crime and shuts down denials of guilt. The minimization
phase involves the interrogator justifying the crime and providing the suspect with the
option of confessing as a way to escape the interrogation (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004).
Kassin and McNall (1991) suggested that the techniques used by Reid and
others can be broken down into two primary techniques, namely: maximization and
minimization. Maximization techniques are confrontational in nature and use intimidation
tactics to persuade the suspect to confess. This can be accomplished through the
presentation of false evidence, exaggerating the seriousness of the consequences or
maintaining a firm stance on the guilt of the suspect. For example, the interrogator might
erroneously tell the suspect that his or her fingerprints have been found on the murder
weapon. Minimization techniques are “soft sell” tactics that attempt to mislead the
4

suspect into a false sense of security. This can be achieved by justifying the situation,
sympathizing with the suspect to gain trust or reducing the perceived consequences of
confessing. For example, the interrogator might convey to the suspect that the crime
was an act of self-defense, and therefore justifiable. To evaluate these two techniques,
Kassin and McNall (1991) assessed participants’ perceptions of various interrogation
transcripts. When minimization techniques were displayed, participants perceived the
interrogation as non-coercive, but believed that an implicit offer of leniency was made in
return for the suspect’s confession. When they read the maximization transcript,
participants believed there was a threat of harsher punishment if the suspect did not
confess (Kassin & McNall, 1991). As a result, Kassin and McNall (1991) posited that the
use of maximization and minimization techniques may alter a suspect’s perception of
the expected consequences of confessing and this manipulation may affect a suspect’s
decision to confess.
Laboratory Research on Interrogations and Confessions
Kassin and Kiechel (1996) developed the first laboratory paradigm, known as the
“ALT key” paradigm, to investigate false confessions. In this paradigm, the participant is
asked to type letters on a computer while they are being read aloud by a confederate
who poses as another participant. Participants are specifically warned not to press the
ALT key as this will cause the computer program to crash and all data will be lost. The
computer used in this study was actually programmed to crash after a certain amount of
time and the experimenter would then accuse the participant of pressing the ALT key
(i.e., the “crime” in this paradigm). In the original Kassin and Kiechel (1996) study, the
researchers manipulated the vulnerability of the subject by varying the speed that they
5

were expected to type the letters. By reading the letters, at a faster pace, the participant
was more likely to accidentally strike the ALT key (though no participants actually hit the
ALT key). The researchers also manipulated the use of false incriminating evidence by
having the confederate testify to having seen the participant press the ALT key. The
resulting overall confession rate for this study was 69%. In the high vulnerability with
incriminating evidence condition, 100% of participants confessed to hitting the ALT key.
This paradigm has been used to investigate other factors influencing false confessions
including a preexisting state of stress (Forrest, Wadkins, & Miller, 2002), the gender of
the interrogator or suspect (Abboud, Wadkins, Forrest, Lange &Alavi, 2002), the
suspect’s age (Redlich & Goodman, 2003), individual difference variables like locus of
control and authoritarianism (Forrest, Wadkins, & Larson, 2006), and the consequences
of confession (Horselenberg, Merckelbach, & Josephs, 2003).
The ALT key paradigm has also been used to investigate the effects of
minimization and maximization techniques (Klaver, Rose, & Lee, 2008). In the
minimization condition, the experimenter reduced the participants’ culpability by blaming
the computer program for the crash, deeming the crash an accident. In the
maximization condition, the experimenter exaggerated the seriousness of the situation
and used techniques to intimidate participants. Results indicated that the use of
minimization techniques increased the likelihood of false confessions.
While the “ALT key” paradigm has been useful in studying interrogations and
false confessions, it has certain limitations. Striking the ALT key is an accidental form of
carelessness, rather than an intentional act, and this lack of intent makes it difficult to
generalize to a real world criminal situation. It is also difficult to examine true vs. false
6

confessions using this paradigm given that all participants are innocent of pressing the
ALT key. This limitation makes it impossible to examine the diagnostic value (i.e., the
ratio of true vs. false confessions) of a given interrogation technique.
Recently, another paradigm has been developed by Russano, Meissner,
Narchet, and Kassin (2005) that seeks to overcome some of the limitations of the ALT
key paradigm. In this paradigm, participants are told that the researchers are examining
individual versus team decision-making and participants are asked to work with a
partner (who is actually a confederate of this experiment) to solve several individual and
team logic problems. Participants are explicitly instructed not to work together on the
individual problems. During the problem solving phase, the confederate asks the
participant for assistance on one of the individual problems, thus manipulating the guiltinnocence of the participant. In previous studies using this paradigm, more than 90% of
participants willingly gave assistance to the participant (Russano et al., 2005; Narchet,
Meissner, & Russano, 2007). In the innocent condition, the confederate does not ask for
any assistance. After the problem solving phase, the experimenter (who remains blind
to the guilt-innocence of the participant) informs both parties that there seems to be a
problem and separates the two. After a short period of isolation, the experimenter
begins to “interrogate” the participant, based upon a scripted interaction.
This paradigm has several advantages over the original ALT key paradigm. First,
the act of breaking the rules of the experiment and sharing information on the individual
problem can be considered a form of academic dishonesty. This is considered a
significant act in an academic setting and carries fairly serious consequences for the
participant. Also, this act requires intent from the participants. They must choose
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whether or not to give the confederate the information. In addition, the guilt or innocence
of the participants can be manipulated so that researchers can examine various factors
and the specific interrogation techniques that can lead both guilty and innocent
participants to confess. Finally, this paradigm also allows researchers to examine the
diagnostic value of interrogation techniques. By assessing diagnosticity, researchers
are able to determine those techniques that will elicit the most useful, accurate
information, and the use of these techniques may speed up the conviction process for
guilty suspects and protect innocent suspects from wrongful convictions.
In the original Russano et al. (2005) study, the researchers examined the use of
minimization techniques versus an explicit offer of leniency during an interrogation.
Results indicated that the use of these techniques increased both true and false
confessions. The researchers also examined diagnosticity, or the ratio of true to false
confessions. Diagnosticity was lower when both minimization and leniency techniques
were used and higher when neither technique was used. Additionally, innocent
participants in the minimization interrogation condition felt more pressure to confess
than those in the control condition. This paradigm has been used in subsequent studies
to examine several other factors that impact interrogations and confessions such as
investigator biases, non-coercive techniques and combinations of minimization and
maximization techniques (Narchet et al., 2007).
Narchet et al. (2007) trained interrogators on 15 different interrogation
techniques, including both minimization and maximization techniques. Interrogators
were given information regarding the guilt or innocence of the participant and were then
allowed to use any of the techniques they had been taught. Results indicated that the
8

use of minimization and maximization techniques reduced diagnosticity. Using a postinterrogation questionnaire, the authors found that perceived proof of guilt, participants’
feelings of guilt, and perceived pressure influenced decisions to confess for both guilty
and innocent participants, while the perceived consequences of confessing influenced
the decision to confess for guilty participants.
The Current Studies
As previously discussed, researchers have identified two common techniques
used to elicit a confession, minimization and maximization (Kassin & McNall, 1991).
These techniques often involve a “package” of techniques that are used in conjunction
throughout an interrogation. For example, the interrogator may tell the suspect that
officers found his fingerprints on the murder weapon, a maximization technique, and
then justify the crime by saying that it must have been self-defense, a minimization
technique. In another example, the interrogator may use minimization techniques to
sympathize with the suspect to gain their trust and then, using maximization,
exaggerate the consequences of not confessing.
Researchers have suggested that minimization and maximization techniques
may influence decisions to confess through pragmatic implication that the
consequences associated with confessing are controlled by the interrogator.
Specifically, research suggests that this manipulation of consequences can be seen
through the use of minimization as the equivalent of an offer of leniency, while
maximization may be understood as the equivalent of a threat of harsher punishment
(Kassin & McNall, 1991). It is proposed here and elsewhere (see Russano et al., 2005)
that this manipulation of the perceived consequences may impact a suspect’s decision
9

to confess. However, not all techniques that have been categorized as minimization or
maximization appear to involve the manipulation of consequences – thus, the current
study sought to distinguish between these various techniques by identifying those that
appear to manipulate a suspect’s perception of the consequences and those that do
not. Examples of minimization and maximization techniques that vary the perceived
consequences associated with confessing can be seen in Table 1. Given the
implications of the use of these techniques and the decreased diagnosticity associated
with their use (Narchet et al., 2007; Russano et al., 2005), it was important to further
delineate between the various techniques that have been previously categorized as
involving minimization and maximization.
In Experiment 1, I examined the social perceptions of minimization and
maximization techniques that were manipulated to vary the consequences associated
with confessing. An additional purpose of this experiment was to ensure that the scripts
used in Experiment 2 successfully manipulated participants’ perceptions of the
consequences associated with confession. Participants read a description of the
Russano et al. (2005) paradigm and were asked to imagine that they were a participant
in the study. After reading the scenario, participants read about the interrogation of the
participant in which maximization and minimization techniques were manipulated.
Participants then answered questions about whether they would confess to sharing
information and whether other people would confess if they were in the same situation.
Based on previous survey research (Henkel, Coffman, & Dailey, 2008), it was predicted
that participants would recognize that others might falsely confess, but fail to recognize
this possibility when considering themselves in the same situation.
10

The purpose of Experiment 2 was to examine how the use of interrogation
techniques that manipulate the perceived consequences of confessing influence the
likelihood of obtaining true versus false confessions. To assess this I employed the
Russano et al. (2005) paradigm and manipulated the techniques presented to
participants. It was predicted that minimization and maximization techniques that
influence the perceived consequences of confessing will elicit less diagnostic
information, and in particular increase the likelihood of a false confession. It was also
hypothesized that participants’ perceptions of the interrogation as it relates to feelings of
pressure, beliefs about the consequences associated with confessing, feelings of guilt,
and perceptions of the proof against them would be associated with participants’
decision to confess.
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Experiment 1
Method
Participants. One hundred and thirty-eight participants were recruited from
undergraduate psychology courses at the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP). The
sample was mostly Hispanic (74.6%) and female (60%), with a mean age of 24 years.
Design and procedure. A 2 (guilty vs. innocent participant) x 2 (interrogation
methods that manipulate consequences vs. no consequences) x 2 (own vs. other
likelihood of confession) mixed factorial design was used in the present study. Guiltinnocence and interrogation method were manipulated between-subjects, while
participants’ ratings of own vs. other likelihood of confession were presented as a
repeated measure.
Participants were presented with a description of the Russano et al. (2005)
paradigm in which two students (A and B) were instructed to solve several logic
problems, some of which were to be solved together and some individually. In the guilty
condition, participants were told that during one of the individual problems, student A
asked student B for help with one of the problems and that student B responded by
providing the answer. Participants in the innocent condition were told that the
experimental session went according to the instructions given. In both conditions,
participants read that after finishing the set of logic problems, the research assistant
entered the testing room, explained that there seemed to be a problem, and separated
students A and B.
Participants then read an interrogation script in which the interrogation methods
were manipulated. In the consequences condition, the research assistant (or
12

“interrogator”) employed minimization and maximization techniques that were
hypothesized to manipulate the perceived consequences of confessing. In the no
manipulation of perceived consequences condition, the research assistant employed
minimization and maximization techniques that were hypothesized not to manipulate the
perceived consequences of confessing. Examples of each of these techniques can be
seen in Table 1. At the end of both interrogation scenarios, the research assistant asked
student B to sign a statement admitting to sharing information on the individual problem.
After reading the introduction and interrogation scenario, participants answered
to estimate the likelihood that: (1) they would sign a confession statement if they were
placed in that situation and (2) other people would sign a confession statement if they
were placed in that situation.
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Experiment1: Results & Discussion
A 2 (guilty vs. innocent participant) x 2 (interrogation methods that manipulate
consequences vs. no consequences) x 2 (own vs. other likelihood of confession) mixed
factorial ANOVA was conducted. Table 2 presents the mean estimates of confession
across cells of the design. Main effects of own vs. other confession estimates, F(1,134)
= 23.58, p < .001, η2 = .15, guilt-innocence, F(1,134) = 104.13, p < .001, η2 = .44, and
interrogation method, F(1,134) = 10.75, p < .01, η2 = .07, were found. Participants who
read a guilty script were more likely to endorse confession (across own vs. other
estimates, M = 51.2%) than did those who read an innocent script (M = 31.5%,), and
participants believed themselves less likely to confess than others in the same situation
(Ms = 22.5% vs. 60.1%, respectively). Importantly, participants who read a script that
was thought to manipulate the consequences associated with confession were
significantly more likely to endorse confession (M = 48.0%) when compared with those
reading a script that was thought to not manipulate perceived consequences (M =
34.7%).
In addition to the main effects, a significant guilt-innocence x own-other
confession x interrogation method interaction was observed, F(1,134) = 4.24, p < .05, η2
= .03. In order to assess this interaction, separate ANOVAs were conducted for each
interrogation method. For the no manipulation of consequences script, main effects of
guilt-innocence, F(1,67) = 8.22, p < .01, η2 = .11, and own-other confessions, F(1,67) =
62.0, p < .001, η2 = .48, were found. For the manipulation of consequences script, these
main effects for guilt-innocence, F(1,67) = 15.97, p < .001, η2 = .19, and own-other
confession, F(1,67) = 44.75, p < .001, η2 = .40, were found as well as a guilt-innocence
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x own-other confession interaction, F(1,67) = 10.86, p < .01, η2 = .14. (See Table 2 for
means and standard deviations). The data suggest participants believed that while
guilty others would be more likely to confess than innocent others when the
consequences associated with confessing were not manipulated, they believed that
both guilty and innocent individuals would be equally likely to confess under conditions
in which the consequences of confessing were manipulated.
When considering whether they, themselves, would confess under these
conditions, participants believed that, if guilty, they would be more likely to confess
when the consequences were manipulated when compared with the no manipulation
condition. If innocent, however, participants rated the likelihood of themselves
confessing as low regardless of interrogation condition. When interpreting these
results, however, it is important to note that the scales used for the own and other
likelihood of confession rates were not equivalent. When evaluating their own likelihood
of confession participants responded yes or no, whereas when evaluating others’
likelihood of confession participants provided a rating between 0 and 100. Replication of
these findings using equivalent 0 to 100 point scales would appear appropriate.
Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 indicate that participants perceive the
use of manipulative techniques in the interrogation scripts and understand that such
techniques may lead (other) people to falsely confess. However, participants fail to
recognize the impact of manipulative techniques when estimating their own confession
decisions. This finding is consistent with prior research indicating that participants
believe that false confessions occur and that people have certain vulnerabilities to false
confessions, but that they themselves would never be a victim of these vulnerabilities
15

(Henkel, Coffman, & Dailey, 2008). It appears that participants are falling victim to the
fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977) by failing to take into account situational
factors, like manipulation of the perceived consequences of confessing, when
evaluating their own behavior in the interrogation room. In contrast, they appear to be
perceptive to situational factors when considering how other people would react to an
interrogation. This finding could also be due to the self-serving bias, or the tendency for
people to believe that personal successes (in this case not falling victim to manipulative
interrogation techniques) are a reflection of their own abilities and efforts (Miller & Ross,
1975). This self-enhancement occurs because people accept information that fits with
their goals or desires, while rejecting other conflicting information. In this case,
participants maintain a positive self-image by believing that they would not be
influenced by manipulative interrogation techniques and that they would therefore not
provide a false confession. In Experiment 2, we moved from examining the social
perception of interrogation techniques to examining the actual behavior of participants in
the Russano et al. (2005) paradigm to test whether confession behavior was similar to
social perception of confession behavior.
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Experiment 2
Method
Participants. One hundred and thirty-two participants were recruited for the
current experiment. Based on previous studies (Kassin et al., 2005; Lassiter et al.,
2002), a cell size of 30 was estimated to achieve an effect size of d = .50 with power =
.80 at alpha = .05 level. The current recruitment achieved 33 participants per cell of the
design. All participants were undergraduate students at UTEP, mostly female (65.2%)
and Hispanic (88.6%), with a mean age of 19 years.
Design and procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four
experimental conditions based on a 2 (guilt vs. innocence) x 2 (interrogation methods
that manipulate consequences vs. no consequences) between-subjects factorial design.
Two male and two female undergraduate research assistants were recruited to
participate as experimenters. Five female undergraduates were recruited to serve as
confederates and lab managers. All research assistants were trained extensively to
ensure that the interview scripts were followed for each participant and that the
procedure was identical for each participant. Interrogations were video recorded and
assessed to ensure that experimenters adhered to the scripted manipulations. The
beginning of the experimental session was identical for all conditions. The confederate
and participant arrived at the lab at the scheduled experiment time. The experimenter
greeted both at the door and asked them to be seated in the testing room. The testing
room was a small, bare room with no windows, similar to what may be used for
interrogations in a police station. After the participant and confederate read and signed
the informed consent, the experimenter explained that the purpose of the study was to
17

examine individual versus group decision-making. Several phases of the experiment
then commenced.
In the rapport-building phase, the experimenter explained that in a realistic
business setting, the team members would already know each other as co-workers. To
simulate this realistic setting, the experimenter asked the participants to take a few
minutes to get to know one another in order to help them feel more like co-workers and
increase feelings of cooperation. The experimenter then encouraged the participants to
exchange basic information and then left the room for two min to give them the privacy
to do so.
After two min, the experimenter re-entered the room and began the problemsolving phase. The experimenter explained that the individual problems were to be
completed entirely individually, without any discussion about answers or strategies. The
team problems were to be worked on together by sharing information about strategies
and answers. Participants were instructed to alternate between working on the
individual problems and the team problems and that each problem should take about
five min to complete. The experimenter instructed the participants to wait until both
people were finished with the individual problems before moving on to the group
problems and to try to come up with an answer for each problem. Participants were
reminded several times about the importance of working together on the team problems
and working alone on the individual problems. This instruction served as the critical rule
of the experiment. Once the experimenter had given all of the directions, participants
were asked to begin working on the problems and to open the door to let the
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experimenter know when they had completed both packets. The experimenter then left
the room so that the participants could work in the room by themselves.
During the manipulation phase, in the guilty condition, while working on the last
individual problem, the “triangle problem,” the confederate pretended she was having a
difficult time arriving at an answer. After waiting to ensure that the participant has come
up with an answer to the problem, she asked the participant what answer he/she
calculated. This allows the participant the chance to break the rules of the experiment or
“cheat.” In the innocent condition, the confederate did not attempt to elicit any
information about the problem from the participant. Participants that did not comply with
the request for information in the guilty condition were not questioned by the
experimenter. Participants that attempted to elicit information from the confederate in
the innocent condition were also not questioned by the experimenter. Instead, both of
these categories of participants (n = 16) moved from the problem solving phase to the
debriefing phase.
The filler task phase began once the experimenter was notified that the
participant and confederate had completed the problems, he or she re-entered the
testing room, collected the completed packets, and instructed the participants to
complete a post-problem solving questionnaire. The experimenter again left the room
while the participants completed the questionnaire that asked them to respond to
questions about individual and team work.
Once the participants informed the experimenter that they had completed the
questionnaire, the experimenter re-entered the room and began the interrogation phase
of the experiment. The experimenter explained that he or she had looked over the
19

packets and there appeared to be a problem. The experimenter did not actually review
the problems as this may have alerted him or her to the experimental condition of the
participant. He or she then asked the confederate to leave the room so that he or she
could speak to both of them individually. The confederate then left the testing room and
completed a post-experimental questionnaire to ensure that the manipulation was
successful. After five min of isolation, the experimenter re-entered the testing room,
moved the free chair around the table to be closer to the participant and began
questioning the participant about breaking the rules of the experiment by sharing
information on the triangle problem. The experimenter stated that the supervising
professor had been notified and that he or she has been instructed to document the
situation. The experimenter also informed the participant that the professor was irritated
about the situation and may consider this a case of academic cheating. The participant
was also told that the professor would make the final decision about the consequences
of the situation and about whom else he may notify about the situation. At this point in
the questioning, the experimenter continued with one of the two interview approaches
used in Experiment 1 (see Appendices A and B).
Experimenters were kept blind to the guilt or innocence of the participant and
were not aware of the expected results of each interrogation script and the research
hypotheses. Experimenters completed a self report survey about their performance after
each participant to alert the lab manager to any diversions from the script or
inconsistencies in script delivery. Videotapes were also reviewed in order to ensure that
each of the experimenters delivered the script consistently to each participant.
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At the end of each of the interrogation scripts, the experimenter asked the
participant to sign a handwritten statement admitting to sharing information on the
triangle problem. If the participant signed the statement, the experimenter thanked
him/her for his/her cooperation and asked for an explanation of his/her side of the story
and exited the room, explaining that someone would be with the participant shortly. If
the participant refused, the experimenter then went through up to two shorter
reiterations of the script, repeating the same request using different words. If the
participant still refused to sign the statement, the experimenter thanked the participant
for his/her time and exited the room, explaining someone would be with him/her shortly.
Once the experimenter left the room, the lab manager immediately entered the
testing room to begin thoroughly debriefing the participant. The lab manager first probed
the participant for any suspicions they had before and/or during the experimental
session. The lab manager explained the true purpose and set up of the experiment,
explained that the participant is not in any trouble, and that there was no angry
professor to face. The main focus of the debriefing was to ensure that the participant
understood why the use of deception was necessary and that the participant understood
he/she was not in any trouble. Participants were told that all events during the
experimental session would remain completely confidential. At this time, participants
were also informed about the videotaping of the session. Lab managers obtained a
pressure rating, on a scale from 0 to 10, as a self report measure of how much pressure
the participant felt to sign the statement admitting to sharing information. A Debriefing
Questionnaire was completed by the participant using MediaLab. This questionnaire
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informed the researchers about the effects of the interrogation tactics employed and the
participant’s decision to sign or not sign the statement.
After completing the questionnaire, the lab manager explained the secondary
consent form and obtained consent to use the videotapes for future research. The lab
manager also explained the importance of maintaining confidentiality about the true
purpose and nature of the experiment. Participants were asked to sign a confidentiality
agreement, agreeing not to discuss or share any of the details of the study in order to
maintain the integrity of the study. Upon completion of these forms, the participant was
asked if he/she had any further questions about the experiment, was given the contact
information of the researchers and was thanked and excused. The lab manager then
completed a post-experimental questionnaire in order to report any suspicions the
participant had or any problems with the experiment.
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Experiment 2: Results & Discussion
Manipulation check. After the interrogation phase, participants completed a
questionnaire assessing, among other items, how severe the consequences would be
to admitting to sharing information on the triangle problem on a scale from 1 (extremely
severe) to 7 (not at all severe). Participants in the consequences condition perceived
that the consequences of admitting to sharing information would be less severe (M =
4.00, SD = 1.72) than those participants in the no manipulation of consequences
condition (M = 3.41, SD = 1.77), t(130) = 1.96, p = .05, thereby confirming our
successful manipulation of the perceived consequences of confessing.
True vs. false confessions. A 2 (interrogation method: consequences vs. no
consequences) x 2 (guilt vs. innocence) x 2 (interrogator gender: male vs. female)
hierarchical loglinear analysis was conducted on participants’ decision to confess (sign
vs. no sign). While interrogator gender was included as a control variable, no main
effects or interactions involving this variable were observed. Confession rates for guilty
and innocent participants across the interrogation manipulation are presented in Table
3, along with diagnosticity ratios computed across the interrogative conditions.
Consistent with previous research, (Russano, 2005; Narchet, 2007) a significant
main effect of guilt was found, χ²(1) = 50.53, p < .001, such that guilty participants were
more likely to confess (89.4%) than innocent participants (31.8%). This main effect,
however, was qualified by a significant interrogation method x guilt- innocence
interaction, χ²(1) = 8.48, p < .01. To assess this interaction, the use of the two
interrogation methods for guilty and innocent participants was investigated separately.
Pairwise comparisons demonstrated that true confessions significantly decreased when
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the interrogation involved implications regarding the consequences associated with
confessing, χ²(1) = 4.50, p < .05. In addition, false confessions significantly increased
when the consequences associated with confessing were implied, χ²(1) = 3.60, p = .05.
It is also informative to examine the diagnostic value of the confession evidence
elicited by each interrogative approach. Diagnosticity can be computed as the ratio of
true:false confessions elicited, with higher ratios indicating a greater likelihood of true
(vs. false) evidence being elicited. Consistent with the trade-off in true vs. false
confessions across the interrogation manipulation noted above, it appears that
techniques that do not manipulate the perceived consequences associated with
confessing were 2.37 times more diagnostic than techniques that manipulated
participants’ perceptions of the consequences.
Predicting true vs. false confessions. Following the interrogation, participants
were asked several items regarding their perceptions of the interrogation, including (a)
the amount of pressure they felt was placed upon them by the interrogator, (b) their
assessment of the consequences associated with confessing, (c) how guilty they were
made to feel by the interrogator, and (d) their perceptions of the proof of guilt against
them. These items were selected given that they were most predictive of confession in
previous research (see Narchet et al., 2007). Logistic regressions were conducted
separately for guilty and innocent participants to assess the associations between these
measures and the likelihood of true vs. false confessions. Significant regression models
were observed for both guilty, χ²(4) = 16.51, p < .01, and innocent, χ²(4) = 25.49, p <
.001, participants. Results of the guilty model suggested that true confessions were
significantly associated with participants’ feelings of guilt, b = .75, Wald = 4.13, p < .05,
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and their perceptions of the proof of guilt, b = .66, Wald = 4.15, p < .05. In contrast, the
innocent model demonstrated that false confessions were significantly associated with
participants’ perceptions of pressure, b = .55, Wald = 6.44, p = .01, and the
consequences associated with confessing, b = .54, Wald = 8.39, p < .01. True
confessions were more likely when participants experienced increased feelings of guilt
and thought the interrogator had proof of the transgression, while false confessions
appeared to be motivated by increased perceptions of pressure and consequences of
confession.
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General Discussion
Previous research has found that the use of minimization and maximization
techniques in interrogations can manipulate an individual’s perceptions of the
consequences associated with confessing (Kassin & McNall, 1991). Given the
implications of these techniques and their association with false confessions in general
(Russano et al., 2005; Narchet et al. 2007), the current study sought to further delineate
between the two sets of techniques by evaluating how this package of techniques might
manipulate the perceived consequences of confessing. Additionally, it was important to
determine the diagnosticity of these techniques.
The use of minimization and maximization techniques succeeded in manipulating
the perceived consequences of confessing. Participants (in Exp. 2) who were exposed
to the manipulation of perceived consequences condition believed that the
consequences of confessing to sharing information would be less severe than those in
the no manipulation of consequences condition. In the manipulation of consequences
script, interrogators stressed the benefit of cooperation, minimized the seriousness of
sharing information, presented false evidence against the participant, and exaggerated
the charges against the participant. Overall, the script emphasized that confession was
the best way to get out of the situation and the consequences of admitting to sharing
information would be minimal. Given the use of these techniques, the participants’
beliefs that the consequences of confessing would be less severe than those in the no
manipulation of consequences condition is consistent with previous research suggesting
that minimization techniques may be considered equivalent to an offer of leniency and
that maximization techniques are the equivalent to a threat of harsher punishment
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(Kassin & McNall, 1991). It appears that participants in the manipulation of
consequences condition believed confessing to sharing information would result in the
least severe consequences.
The manipulation of perceived consequences influenced both participants’ beliefs
about whether they and others would confess (Exp. 1) and also influenced the
diagnostic value of confession evidence (Exp. 2). Participants believed that other people
would be more susceptible to falsely confessing when the consequences associated
with confessing were manipulated, but did not believe this manipulation would affect
their own decisions to confess if innocent. However, when actually participating in the
Russano et al. (2005) paradigm, participants were vulnerable to the manipulation of
consequences and were thereby more likely to provide a false confession. Additionally,
the manipulation of consequences interrogation was less diagnostic than the no
manipulation interrogation as it also reduced the likelihood of obtaining a true
confession.
Given the high cost of false confessions for both society and the innocent, there
would appear to be practice and policy considerations that relate to these findings.
Under current interrogation methods, minimization and maximization techniques are
used together to elicit a confession and all of the techniques tested in this study are
legally permissible. Based on the findings in this study, this practice may be detrimental
to the goal of eliciting true confessions and minimizing false confessions. The
manipulation of consequences associated with some minimization and maximization
techniques appear to yield fewer true confessions, something that it counterproductive
for law enforcement. Further, the use of some of these techniques produced more false
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confessions, increasing risk to the innocent suspect. By simply avoiding those
dangerous and manipulative techniques, and focusing on other aspects of minimization
and maximization, we can significantly improve the practice of interrogation and the
diagnostic value of the evidence.
The current data suggest that true and false confessions may be predicted by
different mechanisms. For innocent participants, the perception of consequences of
confession and the perceived pressure to confess were significantly associated with
provision of a false confession. However, guilty participants were driven to confess
based on the perceived amount of proof the interrogator had against them and how
guilty they felt about their actions. These findings suggest that techniques that focus on
the strength of the (true) evidence against the suspect and emphasize the morality of
confession may be more productive for eliciting true confessions and limiting the
vulnerability of the innocent.
Future research is needed to further delineate the effects of minimization and
maximization techniques. While the present research has identified one dimension
along which these techniques may be distinguished (i.e., consequences associated with
confession), there may be other dimensions along which one could differentiate
minimization and maximization techniques. Other possible dimensions could include the
type of rapport the interrogator builds with the suspect. Some techniques in this
package require a friendly rapport between the suspect and interrogator while others
require a more authoritative/submissive rapport. The overall tone with which the
interrogator approaches the interrogation may influence the rate of true vs. false
confessions.
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Finally, if the suspect confesses and subsequently goes to trial, a jury will
evaluate the confession evidence. Previous research has shown that confession
evidence, whether disputed or not, has an overwhelming impact on jurors’ decisions to
convict (Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Kassin & Neumann, 1997) and that people perform
around chance levels when distinguishing between true and false confessions (Kassin,
Meissner, & Norwick, 2005). The videotaped confessions collected during this study will
be evaluated by participants in order to further investigate social perceptions of
interrogation techniques and participants’ ability to distinguish between the true and
false confessions. Results from Experiment 1 indicated that participants had a difficult
time recognizing the situational influences of the interrogation scenario when evaluating
others’ decisions to confess. Potential jurors’ may also have difficulty recognizing the
situational influences of an interrogation scenario in which the interrogator manipulates
the perceived consequences of confession.
The argument could be made that results from the current study cannot be
generalized to the real-world because the paradigm does not compare to the actual
experience of an interrogation. It is clear that the pressures and reality of a true criminal
interrogation cannot be completely examined in a laboratory setting due to ethical
concerns. However, just as criminal suspects face serious consequences for the
conviction of crime for which they are accused, our student participants are aware of the
serious consequences associated with academic dishonesty within the university setting
(i.e., suspension from the university, loss of scholarship). The pressure and anxiety
experienced by participants in the laboratory is genuine and significant (Russano et al.
2005). Just as criminal suspects are motivated to avoid serious consequences
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associated with confession, our student participants appeared similarly motivated to
avoid the consequences and stigma associated with a charge of academic dishonesty.
The recent DNA exonerations and Drizin and Leo’s (2004) analysis of “proven”
false confessions have revealed the important role of false confession evidence in many
wrongful conviction cases. Researchers have begun to examine the factors that lead to
false confessions and have found that the use of minimization and maximization
techniques contribute to the false confession phenomenon. The current studies found
that minimization and maximization techniques directly manipulate the perceived
consequences of confession and thereby impact the diagnostic value of confession
evidence. The use of this package of techniques provides little to no diagnostic value in
that through their use, law enforcement not only reduces true confessions, but also
increases false confessions.
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Table 1

Minimization and Maximization Techniques that Vary and Do Not Vary the Perceived
Consequences of Confession

Minimization

Maximization

stress benefit of cooperation

exaggerate consequences

downplay consequences

co-conspirators against each other

face-saving excuses

overstate the charges

express sympathy

assume unfriendly demeanor

assume friendly demeanor

firm belief in guilt

boost ego/use flattery

shut down denials

Consequences

No
Consequences
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Table 2
Self vs. Others Confession Rates as a Function of Interrogation Method

Self

Others

Guilty

50.0% (50.8)

68.9% (21.0)

Innocent

8.6% (28.4)

64.4% (25.3)

Guilty

25.7% (44.3)

60.0% (24.3)

Innocent

5.9% (23.8)

47.1% (26.3)

Consequences

No
Consequences
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Table 3
True and False Confession Rates and Diagnosticity by Interrogation Method

Condition

True
Confessions

False
Confessions

Diagnosticity

Consequences

81.8%

42.4%

1.93

No
Consequences

97.0%

21.2%

4.58
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Appendix A
Interrogation Phase – No Manipulation of Consequences
*Experimenter reenters room approximately five minutes later and has a seat across
from participant*
E: Ok, “participant’s name,” I’ve just been talking to (Confederate’s name), and it looks
like we DO have a problem. What I’m going to ask you to do is to just hear me out and
listen to what I have to say before you explain your side of the story, ok?
While you two completed the reaction questionnaires, I had a chance to look over the
logic problems you two solved. Based on what I saw, I became convinced that the two
of you did not follow the rules of the experiment; it looks to me like you shared
information on at one least of the individual problems by working together. The reason I
think the two of you shared information during the individual problem-solving phase is
because you have the same wrong answer on the triangle problem. It’s HIGHLY
unlikely that this would happen by chance, and if you did share information, it is a
MAJOR problem, because it would mean that not only did you break the rules of the
experiment, but you may have compromised the integrity of the study.
After I separated the two of you, I wasn’t really sure how to handle this situation, so I
called my professor to find out what I should do. I explained that the two of you came
up with the same wrong answer on the triangle problem, and he agreed that it was
highly unlikely that that would happen by chance. He said that the first thing we need to
do is document what happened. He asked me to ask each of you to sign a piece of
paper admitting that you shared information on the triangle problem. Either way,
whether you sign or you don’t sign, I have to call him back and see what he wants to do
next.
Just so you know, I could tell by talking to him that he’s pretty annoyed and upset that
this is happening. I want to tell you upfront that I’m really not sure how he’s going to
handle this situation. I’m not sure how serious he’s going to consider this or who else
he might notify about the situation. He might even consider this a case of cheating.
(Tone should be firm and unfriendly.)
Look, I’m going to level with you. I already looked over the problems and I KNOW you
guys broke the rules. The statistical probability that you two would have come up with
the SAME WRONG ANSWER just by chance is incredibly small. I’ve run this study
almost 100 times, and this has NEVER happened before. That shows me you guys
must have shared information on the problem. So here is the situation – I think you
should do the right thing and admit to working together. I am sure you are a good
person who would want to do the right thing and no one wants to be accused of
cheating or breaking the rules. I understand that and when I call my professor back I’ll
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let him know that you came clean about what happened. He’ll see you did the right
thing and I’m sure he’ll respect your honesty.
(Tone should become much more friendly and compassionate, as if you are a friend and
trying to help) Look, I feel for you in this situation and it sucks that this is happening. I
am sorry that you got caught up in all of it. I think you are a good person and you seem
pretty intelligent to me. The smartest thing to do, and the right thing to do here is to sign
the statement, trust me.
Ok, either way, whether you sign or don’t sign, I have to call him back and see what he
wants to do next. I can’t guarantee either way what he’ll decide he wants to do. So here
it is – are you going to sign this?

Reiterate:
1. What you’re telling me isn’t matching up with what I have seen. I think the smart
thing to do is sign the statement. Here it is-will you sign it?
2. Your story is inconsistent with the evidence I have from the problems. I think the
right thing to do is sign this statement. Are you going to sign?
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Appendix B
Interrogation Phase – Manipulates Consequences
*Experimenter reenters room approximately five minutes later and has a seat across
from participant*
E: Ok, “participant’s name,” I’ve just been talking to (Confederate’s name), and it looks
like we DO have a problem. What I’m going to ask you to do is to just hear me out and
listen to what I have to say before you explain your side of the story, ok?
While you two completed the reaction questionnaires, I had a chance to look over the
logic problems you two solved. Based on what I saw, I became convinced that the two
of you did not follow the rules of the experiment; it looks to me like you shared
information on at one least of the individual problems by working together. The reason I
think the two of you shared information during the individual problem-solving phase is
because you have the same wrong answer on the triangle problem. It’s HIGHLY
unlikely that this would happen by chance, and if you did share information, it is a
MAJOR problem, because it would mean that not only did you break the rules of the
experiment, but you may have compromised the integrity of the study.
After I separated the two of you, I wasn’t really sure how to handle this situation, so I
called my professor to find out what I should do. I explained that the two of you came
up with the same wrong answer on the triangle problem, and he agreed that it was
highly unlikely that that would happen by chance. He said that the first thing we need to
do is document what happened. He asked me to ask each of you to sign a piece of
paper admitting that you shared information on the triangle problem. Either way,
whether you sign or you don’t sign, I have to call him back and see what he wants to do
next.
Just so you know, I could tell by talking to him that he’s pretty annoyed and upset that
this is happening. I want to tell you upfront that I’m really not sure how he’s going to
handle this situation. I’m not sure how serious he’s going to consider this or who else
he might notify about the situation. He might even consider this a case of cheating.
Look, I’m going to level with you. I already talked to the other participant and I’m going
to tell you the same thing I told her. So here is the situation – if you are willing to admit
to sharing answers on the triangle problem, I think we can get this thing settled pretty
quickly. I’ll call my professor back, but I’ll make sure to tell him that you guys came
clean and explained what happened. I can’t guarantee what will happen, but my best
guess is that he’ll probably just instruct me to throw out the data, and I should probably
be able to have you out of here within ten minutes or so. BUT if you don’t admit to
sharing answers, I’m afraid this is going to take awhile to straighten out. I’ll have to call
my professor back, and he’ll probably have to come down here to deal with the situation
himself, and my guess is that that will make your situation a lot worse.
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He told me that if he comes down here, he’s going to bring the paperwork that he has to
fill out for violations of academic misconduct. I really think you’re better off just handling
the situation here with me.
Again, I am telling you the same thing I told (confederate’s name) - I think the two of you
probably didn’t realize what a big deal it would be to work together. If I was in your
shoes, I might have made the same mistake. I don’t think you intentionally meant to do
anything wrong – from what I can tell after talking to her, I just think you were trying to
be nice by helping her out. She has already signed the statement so here is my advice
to you.
In my opinion, I really think it’s in your best interest to sign the statement, especially
since she already has. If I call him back and tell him one of you signed and the other
didn’t, he might become even more upset about the whole situation. Either way,
whether you sign or don’t sign, I have to call him back and see what he wants to do
next, but seriously, if I was you, I’d sign it. So here it is – are you going to sign this?
Reiterate:
1. Look, the other participant has already signed, there is no sense in denying what you
did. I think you should just sign the statement.
2. The right thing for you to do is sign the statement, trust me. If you do, I can get you
out of here pretty quick. Are you going to sign it?
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Appendix C
Problem Solving Study Debriefing Questionnaire
1. How much stress did you feel when you were accused of cheating?
1
no
stress

2

3

4

5

6

7
extreme
stress

2. When being questioned by the experimenter about cheating, there were times
that I was worried about what would happen to me.
1
not at all

2

3

4

5

6

7
very much

6

7
very much

3. I felt nervous when the experimenter accused me of cheating.
1
not at all

2

3

4

5

4. I have been in a similar position where I had to deny something that I may or may
not have done before.
1
extremely
similar
situation

2

3

4

5

6

7
not at all
similar

5. How much proof did you think the experimenter had that you had cheated on the
triangle problem?
1
2
Overwhelming

3

4

5

6

7
None

6. How guilty did you feel when the experimenter was questioning you about
cheating on the triangle problem?
1
extremely
guilty

2

3

4

5

6

7
not at all
guilty

7. How severe did you think that the consequences would be if you admitted to
cheating on the
triangle problem?
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1
extremely
severe

2

3

4

5

6

7
not at all
severe

8. My heart was beating fast when the experimenter accused me of cheating.
1
not at all

2

3

4

5

6

7
very much

9. The consequences for not admitting to cheating on the triangle problem would
be severe.
1
strongly
disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7
strongly
agree

3

4

5

6

7
strongly
agree

10. I felt isolated in the room.
1
strongly
disagree

2

11. When you were being questioned by the experimenter, how much pressure did
you feel to sign the statement?
1
2
no pressure
at all

3

4

5

6
7
most pressure
you can imagine

11. Did you share any information (“cheat”) on the triangle problem?
YES

NO

Why did you sign or not sign the confession statement?
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
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